ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Even among scholars who subscribe to some form of originalism in constitutional adjudication, many have grown skeptical of the relevance of Max Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 1 to unearthing constitutional meaning. In the past quarter century, the practice of culling constitutional intent from the notes of the Philadelphia Convention has faced the same conceptual challenges as that of deriving legislative intent from committee reports. If one doubts that Congress possesses a coherent legislative intent, can one even imagine that thirteen different conventions in culturally and politically diverse states shared a coherent collective intent about matters the document left unsettled?
2 If one thinks it dicey to ascribe the contents of a legislative committee report to Congress as a whole, how could one possibly attribute the views of the Philadelphia Convention to multiple ratifying conventions that had no access to its then-unpublished notes?
3 As a hermeneutic tool, Farrand's Records might provide, at most, some secondary evidence of the way eighteenth-century Americans used language, especially technical legal language. 4 But even when used for that purpose, the notes of the Philadelphia Convention collect the practices of only a small sample of eighteenth-century Americans, even informed and politically active ones. 5 On that view, the notes have relatively little to tell us about constitutional meaning.
At the same time, however, the Records may confirm something more fundamental about the nature of the original Constitution itself-that its text is the product of a hardscrabble compromise, rather than a majestic articulation of broad principle. This reading of the Records flies in the teeth of the so-called "living Constitution" theory articulated, at times, by the Supreme Court. 6 Commonly traced to Yet Farrand's Records confirm that, at least with respect to the original seven articles that compose the structural part of the document, the living Constitution theory does not describe reality. The document itself does not contain merely broad statements of principle, but instead expresses policies at widely variant levels of generality. 12 What the Records tell interpreters is that the framers debated, fought, and bargained over the details reflected in the document. 13 The details are not simply placeholders for broader principles; they are carefully considered decisions to go so far and no farther in crafting a policy. One could know this without Farrand's Records. But the Records amply confirm that the document is a "bundle of compromises."
14 Accordingly, any theory of interpretation that treats tex- LAW 7-8 (1996) . This Article evaluates the Court's tradition of living constitutionalism, which takes the intermediate position that interpreters owe fidelity to the written Constitution and that the document's true design permits interpreters to read the rules embedded in the document as markers for broader principles. See infra text accompanying notes 91-103. 7 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 8 Id. at 407. 9 See id. 10 See supra note 6. 11 See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 12 See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939 REV. , 1978 REV. (2011 . Of course, putting terms of art to one side, when the document does adopt open-ended standards, such a choice must be read to confer greater interpretive discretion upon interpreters charged with implementing those standards. See id. at 2012. While this Article focuses on the type of generality shifting that treats constitutional rules as markers for broader principles, the Court should no more read standards as rules than rules as standards. See id. at 2023-24. 13 See infra Part II.C. 14 MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 201 (1913) .
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Court, too, has traditionally aspired to identify some form of original intent, understanding, or meaning in cases of first impression. 16 Interestingly, however, many nonoriginalists also care about the historically situated meaning of the text. 17 Even though they do not find such meaning dispositive of constitutional adjudication, many find it at least relevant-a factor to consider, among others, in determining how to apply the Constitution today. 18 Hence, whatever one's priors, problem by analogy to statutes. Legal philosopher Joseph Raz has written that if interpreters do not seek the meaning that the lawmakers themselves would have ascribed to the text, it would not "matter who the members of the legislature are, whether they are democratically elected or not, whether they represent different regions of the country, or classes in the population, whether they are adults or children, sane or insane." Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). By the same token, those who wish to root constitutional decisionmaking in the adopted text predictably want to know what meaning its adopters would have attached to it. See Manning, supra note 12, at 1975-76 (noting the standard interpretive approach of "recovering or reconstructing the historically situated meaning of the constitutional text"). 16 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008) ("In interpreting this [constitutional] text, we are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275-76 (1989) ("We shall not ignore the language of the Excessive Fines Clause, or its history, or the theory on which it is based, in order to apply it to punitive damages."); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838) (concluding that the meaning of the Constitution "must necessarily depend on the words of the constitution [and] the meaning and intention of the convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions . . . in the several states"). 17 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997) (" [V] irtually all practitioners of and commentators on constitutional law accept that original meaning has some relevance to constitutional interpretation."); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086 (1989) ("Almost no one believes that the original understanding is wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation."); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 880-81 (1996) ("Everyone agrees that the text of the Constitution matters. Virtually everyone would agree that sometimes the text is decisive."). 18 For example, some view the constitutional text as a potentially useful common point of reference for coordinating social activity when certain conditions are met. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 906-24 (discussing the coordinating potential of certain constitutional provisions). Others see the original understanding as a source of values for further reasoning about nonoriginalist evolution of the document's meaning. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 17, at 1799-800 ("Resort to historical context enables the nonoriginalist judge to root normative arguments in values that derive from the Constitution's text."). Still others simply regard it as one factor among many to consider in arriving at an interpretive outcome. it is useful to think about the most accurate way to decipher the instructions that constitutionmakers set to paper more than two centuries ago.
Of particular relevance here is the appropriate role for Farrand's Records in that interpretive process. Perceptions of the Records' usefulness have shifted over time as more fundamental conceptions of the nature of originalism have themselves shifted.
19
When modern originalism emerged as an intellectual movement roughly four decades ago, 20 its earliest and most prominent proponents-Raoul Berger and Robert Bork-described their approach as seeking the intent of the framers on questions of constitutional meaning. 21 The intuition behind this approach is straightforward. Because speech is a volitional act, meaning depends on the speaker's intentions. 22 So if an interpreter wants to discover what a lawmaker truly decided, he or she must ask what that lawmaker intended by the words that it chose to express its policy. 23 Accordingly, as Berger put it, "On traditional canons of interpretation, the intention of the framers being unmistakably expressed, that intention is as good as written into the text." (1907) ("The object of genuine interpretation is to discover the rule which the law-maker intended to establish; to discover the intention with which the law-maker made the rule, or the sense which he attached to the words wherein the rule is expressed."). 24 others with the expectation that their commands will be decoded against a backdrop of such practices. 29 As a result, interpreters can properly ascertain a lawmaker's meaning by asking how someone conversant with all the applicable practices would read the text in context. 30 As discussed below, Farrand's Records play a far more limited role under this approach than they would under original intent originalism.
31
What explains the shift from original intent to original meaning? Perhaps originalists took to heart a raft of nonoriginalist critiques of original intent. 32 In a famous article published in the early 1980s, for example, Paul Brest nicely demonstrated the difficulties of reconstructing a coherent "original intent" from a lawmaking process that consisted of countless lawmakers spread across the framing convention and thirteen distinct ratifying conventions. 33 In identical to what they will mean to those to whom they are addressed . . . . That such assumptions pervade the legislative process shows how much law depends on language, on the shared conventions that constitute a language, and on the reciprocity of intentions that conventions comprise."). 30 Put another way, original meaning tries to function as "an objective, hypothetical construct that represents the meaning that the Constitution would have had to a fully-informed public audience. Yet, although these writings may have helped move originalists off original intent, the contemporaneous rise of "the new textualism"-an approach developed in a series of articles, opinions, and speeches by high profile judges who questioned the utility of legislative history as a source of legislative intent-likely solidified the shift. 35 It is at least suggestive that some of the most prominent proponents of original meaning originalism-namely, Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook-have been at the forefront of the new textualism in statutory interpretation. 36 There is, however, a more substantive reason to link these two movements. If there is anything at all to the textualists' well-publicized concerns about the use of legislative history, then it is difficult if not impossible to treat Farrand's Records as authoritative evidence of constitutional intent.
First, building on the intent skepticism of the legal realists, 37 the new textualists have questioned the very existence of collective legislative intent. Put to one side the reality that legislators vote for or from the document using the common law's techniques of construction," which "might or might not be the meaning consciously intended by the document's makers" The chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small. The chance is still smaller that a given determinate, the litigated issue, will not only be within the minds of all these men but will be certain to be selected by all of them as the present limit to which the determinable should be narrowed. . . . Even if the contents of the minds of the legislature were uniform, we have no means of knowing that content except by the external utterances or behavior of these hundreds of men, and in almost every case the only external act is the extremely ambiguous one of acquiescence, which may be motivated in literally hun-
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[Vol. 80:1753 against a bill for countless-and, in most cases, undisclosed-reasons, only some of which have to do with substantive rather than political or strategic considerations. 38 To do intentionalism right, an interpreter must be able to reconstruct from snippets of legislative history what the legislature as a whole would have done about an issue that the statutory text itself does not resolve. 39 That is a tall order. Even if one could somehow reliably identify a set of substantive preferences shared by the legislative majority, those preferences do not translate seamlessly into law. 40 The legislative process is complex, opaque, and path dependent. 41 Legislative outcomes often turn on nonsubstantive factors such as the order in which issues are presented, what strategic voting or logrolling has occurred, and how well a bill's proponents have been able to navigate the countless procedural hurdles that Congress imposes on itself.
42 Although such considerations are not "total dreds of ways, and which by itself indicates little or nothing of the pictures which the statutory descriptions imply.
Id. at 870-71. 38 
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of Public Choice, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 284 (1992). According to Judge Easterbrook:
Any one author has a mix of objectives, motives, desires, and concerns that we fuse together and for which "intent" is a handy label. Legislators care about reelection, about reputation, about ability to do good for constituents or the nation as a whole or posterity. These tug in different directions for anyone with a role in forming or executing laws; the concept of "an" intent for a person is fictive and for an institution hilarious.
Id. at 284. bars to judicial understanding," they are "so integral to the legislative process that judicial predictions of how the legislature would have decided issues it did not in fact decide are bound to be little more than wild guesses." 43 Second, even assuming that Congress has a coherent collective intent, the new textualists have expressed doubt about whether legislative history can supply reliable evidence of such intent. Even with high-profile legislative history such as the reports of the originating committees in each House, one simply cannot know whether a constitutionally sufficient majority of Congress read, much less agreed with, the contents of the legislative history. 44 Nor can one say with confidence that those responsible for generating the legislative historywho may or may not be representative of the chamber as a wholehave accurately portrayed the views or understandings of the majority. 45 Accordingly, as Justice Scalia famously wrote:
enactment of legislation often depends on "idiosyncratic, structural, procedural, and strategic factors"). Consider some of the procedural hurdles that a bill must clear en route to enactment:
The Rules Committee in the House may refuse to grant a rule for a committee bill, thereby scuttling it. The Speaker may use his power to schedule legislation and to control debate in ways detrimental to the prospects of a committee bill. A small group of senators in the U.S. Senate may engage in filibuster and other forms of obstruction. Any individual senator may refuse unanimous consent to procedures that would expedite passage of a committee bill. In short, veto groups are pervasive in legislatures . . . . In earlier days, when Congress had a smaller staff and enacted less legislation, it might have been possible to believe that a significant number of senators or representatives were present for the floor debate, or to read the committee reports, and actually voted on the basis of what they heard or read. Those days, if they ever existed, are long gone. The floor is rarely crowded for a debate, the members being generally occupied with committee business and reporting to the floor only when a quorum call is demanded or a vote is to be taken. And as for committee reports, it is not even certain that the members of the issuing committees have found the time to read them . . . .
46
Both sets of concerns apply a fortiori to Farrand's Records. First, on the question of collective intent, the scope and complexity of the constitutionmaking process makes the legislative process look straightforward and compact by comparison. Though no fan of textualism himself, Professor William Eskridge has written:
If the collective "intent" of the bicameral legislature is an incoherent concept, as the new textualists argue, the collective "understanding" of an entire nation during a constitutional moment must be even more so. After all, a statute running the legislative gauntlet only has to satisfy some portion of the 536 participants (President, 100 Senators, 435 House Members) in the process. The Constitution itself ran the gauntlet of the Philadelphia Convention and thirteen state ratifying conventions, involving thousands of people. The national "understanding" of what the Constitution meant involved millions. 47 Or consider Justice Story's words, penned far closer to the constitutionmaking process itself:
The constitution was adopted by the people of the United States; and it was submitted to the whole upon a just survey of its provisions, as they stood in the text itself. In different states and in different conventions, different and very opposite objections are known to have prevailed; and might well be presumed to prevail. Opposite interpretations, and differthen, should we assume that a legislative history largely fabricated by such a committee will be representative of the full Congress? It almost assuredly will not. Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History 13 (delivered during fall 1985 and spring 1986 at various law schools) (transcript on file with The George Washington Law Review). 46 ent explanations of different provisions, may well be presumed to have been presented in different bodies, to remove local objections, or to win local favour. And there can be no certainty, either that the different state conventions in ratifying the constitution, gave the same uniform interpretation to its language, or that, even in a single state convention, the same reasoning prevailed with a majority, much less with the whole of the supporters of it. . . . It is not to be presumed, that, even in the convention, which framed the constitution, from the causes above-mentioned, and other causes, the clauses were always understood in the same sense, or had precisely the same extent of operation. Every member necessarily judged for himself; and the judgment of no one could, or ought to be, conclusive upon that of others. 48 In other words, it is most unlikely that constitutionmakers shared any sort of uniform intent on unsettled questions of any seriousness.
Second, even if one assumes that constitutionmakers formed a uniform intent about the meaning of the document, it is most unlikely that the ratifiers who gave the Constitution its legal force and effect were aware of, much less agreed with, the views expressed in the Philadelphia Convention. In contrast with a legislative committee that officially reports its collective views of proposed legislation, the Philadelphia Convention produced no official explanation of the Constitution. So even if a hypothetical ratifier had full knowledge of the substance of the debates, that ratifier would have had to make sense of the individual views expressed in countless statements on the Convention floor. Without a great deal of context, it would be impossible to develop a workable knowledge of the relative standing and potential biases of the speakers, or to parse the countless and often-shifting votes that took place during the months of deliberation.
The ratifiers, of course, had only the sketchiest knowledge of what went on in Philadelphia. Early on, the Convention adopted a rule of secrecy.
49 Near its conclusion, moreover, the Convention further decided not to publish the Journal of the Convention or any other papers, but rather to place them in George Washington's custody until he received further instructions from the new Congress (if the Constitution was adopted). 50 51 To be sure, a number of individual delegates injected into the ratification debates their own accounts of the Convention and the intentions of the framers. 52 But if one cannot reliably say that modern legislators are aware of or embrace the representations of intent made by an official committee report, it is most improbable that any particular ratifier-much less a constitutionally sufficient number of themwould have accepted the potentially idiosyncratic representations of intent made after the fact by individual delegates to the Philadelphia Convention.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but even if one accepted the most telling responses to the textualist critique of legislative history, one would still have to reject Farrand's Records as an authoritative source of constitutional intent. Legal scholars have argued that even if one cannot identify the actual or subjective intent of Congress, one might legitimately use legislative history as a source of imputed intent. If Congress enacts legislation against the presumed backdrop of wellsettled rules of statutory construction, 53 and those rules of construction provide that certain kinds of legislative history (e.g., committee reports) will be treated as authoritative evidence of intent, 54 then an interpreter might reasonably impute the contents of such legislative history to Congress, whether or not any particular member has actually read or agreed with those materials. 55 Political scientists, moreover, have argued that textualists overstate the unreliability of legislative history as a proxy for Congress's views. To the extent that pivotal repeat players-such as legislative committees-generate legislative history as agents of the enacting majority, they face potential political sanctions if their assertions badly misrepresent the majority's 51 See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1115. 52 See WARREN, supra note 49, at 792-93. 53 See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 486 (1991) (discussing the presumption "that Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory construction"). 54 See It is beyond this Article's scope to adjudicate the competing conceptual and empirical claims about legislative history. Suffice it to say that even if one accepts the antitextualist view of legislative history, the previously stated concerns about Farrand's Records would remain intact. Even if one believes that eighteenth-century judges were expected to look for constitutional intent, there is no evidence that the ratifiers enacted the Constitution against the backdrop of an established interpretive practice requiring them to privilege the views expressed by its drafters. Nor can one say that the framers somehow spoke as agents of as-yet unformed ratifying conventions, especially since the method of ratification was not settled until near the very end of the Philadelphia Convention. 58 Finally, it is not plausible that the ratifiers generally found their answers to unsettled questions in the deliberations of the gatekeeping Philadelphia Convention, given the Convention's decision not to publicize its proceedings in time for the ratification campaign.
In light of these considerations, it should come as no surprise that a broad swath of both originalists and nonoriginalists tend to agree that Farrand's Records should count for very little in the derivation of constitutional meaning. Indeed, Kesavan and Paulsen say, the Records may be superior to a good eighteenth-century dictionary because they use words (and, more importantly, phrases) in the very contexts in which we are interested in discovering their meaning. 62 In addition, the evolution of a clause or the rejection of proposals or amendments may shed light on how the participants understood the meaning or purpose of particular clauses. 63 Finally, because the Philadelphia Convention's Committee of Style was not authorized to make substantive changes, consulting the more elaborate draft referred to the Committee of Style may clarify the participants' detailed understandings of the document's ultimate meaning.
64
Kesavan and Paulsen subscribe to the original meaning or textualist position. For them, each of these data points has probative value not because it authoritatively reveals a relevant lawmaker's intended meaning, but because it offers some insight into the way the framers, as well-informed eighteenth-century Americans, understood the text. 65 The framers' revealed understanding of the text, in turn, might provide insight into how a hypothetical reasonable person would have understood the words at the time.
66
There is certainly something to what Kesavan and Paulsen say. Even if one rejects using legislative history as authoritative evidence role in the lawmaking process, and not because the utterance has truth value apart from the speaker's identity. See Manning, supra note 55, at 684. 61 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1198. 62 Id. at 1201-02. 63 Id. at 1204-05. 64 Id. at 1206-07. 65 See id. at 1149 (noting that "second-best" sources such as Farrand's Records "are evidence of meaning" but "are not constitutive of meaning, and hence binding determinations of meaning in their own right"). 66 See id. 68 Even hard-nosed textualists like Judge Easterbrook acknowledge that legislative history may give interpreters insight into the "the legal and political culture of the drafters," supply crucial facts about "the setting of the enactment," or reveal "that words with a denotation 'clear' to an outsider are terms of art, with an equally 'clear' but different meaning to an insider."
69 In other words, legislative history-including Farrand's Records-may contain facts that are relevant to interpretation but whose value does not depend on the identity of their utterer as a participant in the lawmaking process.
70
Even on these terms, however, use of the Records is fraught with peril if interpreters credit the assertions contained therein at face value. Of course, the Records are less worrisome than modern legislative history. Whereas modern legislative history is prone to posturing by legislators who know that their utterances will influence constituents and judges, 71 the Convention's choice to conduct itself in secret 67 See Manning, supra note 55, at 732 (noting that committee reports "may simply offer the Court insight into the way in which any reasonable person, skilled in the legal arts, would have understood the relevant phrase, independent of the committee's subjective understanding of statutory meaning"). 68 1789)). Reading Farrand's Records would inform a modern reader, who might not otherwise know of the connection, that the clause originated in a motion by Rufus King "to add, in the words used in the Ordinance of Congs establishing new States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts." 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 439. An interpreter making proper use of the Records would not take that fact as an expression of intent, but rather as an invitation to investigate whether the clause, in fact, tracked the language of the Northwest Ordinance and to consider whether such a connection, if verified, should carry any interpretive significance quite independent of King's utterance. 71 Once legislators know that judges will use legislative history to guide their interpretation, the former have every incentive to salt the record with interpretations favorable to their preferred policy point. See 73 When compilers of actual lexicons define meaning, they consider a comprehensive array of cultural sources to determine the way speakers within the relevant linguistic community use a word in context. 74 Even for a specialized lexicon of legal and political terms, the usage exemplified by the Philadelphia Convention would constitute but one data point in such a compilation. 75 In addition, even putting aside the obvious ways in which the Philadelphia Convention was unrepresentative, there is no good way to know whether its small and elite membership constituted a representative sample of the political community whose linguistic conventions a modern interpreter would want to know. 76 Even if Congress conducted its deliberations in utter secret, it is unlikely that one would treat its records as a reliable lexicon of legal and political terms.
Whether or not its deliberations were intended for public consumption, the Philadelphia Convention was a political body, prone to all of the defects of such bodies. An entire branch of interpretation is predicated on the idea that legislators sometimes act in haste and use language imprecisely. 77 In the heat of battle, even eminent lawmakers can speak or act carelessly or shade their expressions or actions in order to win needed support or gain a desired advantage. Consider 72 See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1189-91. 73 But see id. at 1201 (referring to the debates as a "specialized contextual dictionary"). 74 See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 283-92 (1998). 75 To form an accurate assessment even of specialized meaning, one presumably would have to consult numerous other sources to see how language was used at the time, including the records of the Continental Congress, state ratifying conventions, The Federalist, state legislative debates, newspaper articles, and private correspondence. For an excellent discussion of some of the other contemporaneous sources of legal meaning, see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1148-80. 76 See, e.g., RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 65-66 (2009) (describing the elite status of the framers); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 364 (1986) (noting that the framers were unrepresentative of the people and were not chosen by any "nationally sanctioned" method). Others believe that the framers constitute a good proxy at least for the ratifiers. See, e.g., FARRAND, supra note 14, at 40-41; Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130 (1981) . At a minimum, the idea that interpreters should view the framers' understandings as somehow representative of those of the relevant political and legal community is something to be proved, not assumed. 77 Purposivists rely centrally on that view of legislative behavior. See infra note 106.
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Kesavan and Paulsen's suggestion that modern interpreters use the more detailed pre-Committee of Style draft to clarify ambiguities in the sparer final document. 78 Although the Committee of Style's mandate did not include the authority to make substantive changes, 79 one cannot deny that its members had both the incentive and at least some capacity to sneak their substantive preferences into the document they reported to the Convention. 80 It is also hard to deny that the delegates were susceptible to haste, carelessness, idiosyncrasy, or artifice, making it difficult to treat Farrand's Records as a sort of lexicon.
Again, this is not to say that the Records are utterly without value. In light of the foregoing considerations, however, it would be unwise for an interpreter to predicate a conclusion about constitutional meaning exclusively upon the deliberations of the Philadelphia Convention. 81 Still, in ascertaining meaning, evidence is cumulative. As noted, even unauthoritative sources such as legislative history or The Federalist can provide useful information about interpretive context-perhaps identifying potential terms of art or noting the mischief 78 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 79 See 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 553. 80 As Dean William Treanor has written:
[As chair of the Committee of Style, Gouverneur] Morris also made substantive changes that the record of the debates indicate went unnoticed. He or one of the other members of the committee inserted the Contracts Clause into the Constitution, even though it had been previously voted down. He revised the Territories Clause so that new territories could be permanently kept as territories, rather than eventually being incorporated as states, and, by his own admission, he crafted the change in such a way so as to escape notice. that inspired the legislation. 82 But because such sources lack authority independent of the truth value of their assertions, interpreters must assess their contents against sources external to the debates themselves. 83 To borrow from another context, the weight an interpreter gives to content from Farrand's Records should turn on "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 84 In other words, Farrand's Records may be useful to confirm other evidence about the founding generation's lexicon or the mischiefs it worried about, even if they cannot serve as an independent source of meaning. 
II. THE CONSTITUTION AS COMPROMISE
As a source of confirmation, the Philadelphia Convention tells us something quite fundamental about at least the first seven articles of the Constitution. In Farrand's words, the original document is "a bundle of compromises." 86 This premise contradicts an important conception of the nature of the Constitution, from which one prominent account of constitutional adjudication derives. Tracing back to the time of John Marshall, the Court's "living Constitution" tradition presupposes that the Constitution necessarily reflects broad articulations of principle and that interpreters should read it in that spirit. In practice, this translates to a highly purposive approach to constitutional adjudication that does not treat the text as a hard constraint on adjudicative discretion.
87
At least insofar as the original Constitution is concerned, this conception is misplaced. 88 The detail evident in the text of the document and the varying levels of generality at which it articulates its policies suggest that the Constitution resulted from compromises that paid careful attention to the means, as well as the ends, of government. To respect the process that gave political minorities the right to insist upon compromise as the price of assent, the interpreter must adhere to the lines drawn by the text of the document.
Farrand's Records confirm what the text of the document itself suggests. The clauses of the original Constitution did not emerge as the byproduct of high-minded, abstract debates over principle. They resulted from practical, nitty-gritty compromise over the way government was to work in practice. Treating the detailed structural provisions of the first seven articles of the Constitution as placeholders for broader principles (including freestanding federalism or separation of powers doctrines) 89 ignores the reality that the document strikes numerous balances as part of the bundle of compromises presented to the ratifiers. This does not suggest that we should respect the compromises in the document because the Philadelphia Convention reveals their contents; rather, it merely indicates that the Philadelphia Convention confirms what a reasonable person would otherwise infer from the text: the U.S. Constitution sweats the details and should be interpreted accordingly.
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[Vol. 80:1753 This Part considers the Court's living Constitution tradition. Next, it examines the textual and structural arguments against ascribing that approach to the original document. As in Part I, analogies from the statutory interpretation debate sharpen the comparison of the two competing theories of constitutional interpretation. Finally, this Part offers four examples-presidential selection, the Impeachment Clause, the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, and judicial selection-to illustrate the salient role of practical compromise in the composition of the document.
A. The Living Constitution
The idea of the living Constitution takes many forms, many of which are openly nonoriginalist. 90 The present analysis, however, is concerned only with the way the U.S. Supreme Court uses that framework. The Court provides the appropriate focal point here because its version not only has an ancient pedigree, but also purports to root living constitutionalism in the idea of fidelity to the document. That is, because the Court's version of the living Constitution tries to ground itself in the likely expectations and designs of those who created the document, it falls squarely within the originalist tradition and can be measured against the criteria of originalism. [that] suggests that our legal culture assumes a close connection between legal interpretation in general, and constitutional interpretation in particular, and an evolving ideal of justice"); David A. Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 973, 975-78 (2011) (contrasting the living Constitution approach of common law constitutionalism with the originalist idea "that changes in constitutional law can be justified only by some new discovery about what the relevant provision of the Constitution was taken to mean when it was adopted"). 91 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an "Ism", 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301, 308 (1996) (arguing that "the difference between originalists and nonoriginalists is only a matter of degree" and that "[e]verybody agrees that the Framers' original design exerts at least some pull").
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.
92
To underscore the apparent premise that the nature of a constitution makes the interpretation of such an instrument unique, Marshall admonished: "[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." 93 Although Marshall uttered his famous aphorism in conjunction with affirming broad congressional authority to adapt legislation to unforeseen circumstances under the Necessary and Proper Clause, his reasoning has come to be associated with the idea that judges possess greater authority to interpret the constitutional text flexibly and purposively than they do with other written instruments, such as statutes.
94 Why? The nature of the document makes it reasonable to infer that its adopters would have expected and desired such an approach. Because the Constitution prescribes the architecture for a large polity meant to endure throughout the ages, constitutionmakers cannot reasonably expect to foresee or provide in detail for the many contingencies that the document will have to confront. 95 In other words, interpreters can expect only the "great outlines" and "major objects," not the nitty-gritty detail of a rule-based code. 96 In addition, because constitutionmakers consciously rendered the document 92 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 93 Id. 94 See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 n.25 (1998) ("Marshall, of course, was speaking not of all constitutional interpretation, but of the expansive interpretation of Congress's enumerated power. . . . Nonetheless, these words from McCulloch gave living constitutionalism its mantra."). 95 See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters."). 96 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
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[Vol. 80:1753 nearly impossible to amend-typically requiring the assent of a twothirds majority of each House and three-quarters of the states-they could not reasonably have expected needed adaptations to occur through the amendment process. 97 Accordingly, the living Constitution tradition suggests that the constitutionmaker's design implicitly authorizes judges to adjust even a precise text to unforeseen problems.
To be sure, one aspect of the living Constitution tradition merely holds that judges should not read broadly or generally worded texts narrowly to reflect only the founders' subjective expectations or the precise mischief at which a particular clause was aimed. 98 That version is fully consistent with the textualist approach discussed below. 99 Of greater interest here, though, is the version of living constitutionalism that suggests that judges interpreting the Constitution have extraordinary power to adjust the text itself to unforeseen circumstances. We do not construe constitutional provisions of this sort the way we do statutes, whose drafters can be expected to indicate with some comprehensiveness and exactitude the conduct they wish to forbid or control and to change those prescriptions when they become obsolete. Rather, we strive, when interpreting these seminal constitutional provisions, to effectuate their purposes-to lend them meanings that ensure that the liberties the Framers sought to protect are not undermined by the changing activities of government officials.
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 186-87. 98 In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the Court invoked the living Constitution tradition not to overcome some express "prohibitory words," but rather to reject the claim that a challenged exercise of the Treaty Power, U.S. Const. art. II, cl. 2, could be "forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment." Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433-34. Similarly, in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Court observed that because "[t]ime works changes, [and] brings into existence new conditions and purposes," the Constitution's general wording "must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." Id. at 373; see also supra note 6. 99 See infra Part II.B. 100 See, e.g., Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 439 (1884) ("A constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring fundamental principles, and creating a national sovereignty, and intended to endure for ages and to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs, is not to be interpreted with the strictness of a private contract.").
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THE ROLE OF THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION 1777 "[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." Its provisions are not to be interpreted like those of a municipal code or of a penal statute, though even the latter is to be read so as not to defeat its obvious purpose, or lead to absurd consequences. In defining their scope something more is involved than consultation of the dictionary and the rules of English grammar. They are to be read as a vital part of an organic whole so that the high purpose which illumines every sentence and phrase of the instrument may be given effect in a consistent and harmonious frame-work of government. The Court has hitherto consistently held that a literal reading of a provision of the Constitution which defeats a purpose evident when the instrument is read as a whole, is not to be favored. design. 108 The Section that follows considers a recent tightening up of the Court's approach to statutory interpretation and the implications, if any, for the Court's similarly flexible approach to the Constitution.
B. Legislative Compromise and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution
In recent years, the Court has begun to move away from its strong purposivist approach in favor of an approach that enforces the clear import of the statutory text as written (unless it produces an absurd result).
109 That is to say, the Court now apparently enforces "letter" over "spirit" when the two conflict.
110
What accounts for the change? The Court has become increasingly sensitive to the idea that Congress does not enact purposes or principles in the abstract, but rather strikes compromises that deal with both statutory ends and the means by which they are to be achieved. In a leading case exemplifying its new approach, the Court thus emphasized:
Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague social or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply on the means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation may reflect hard-fought compromises. Invocation of the "plain purpose" of legisla- 108 The leading case for this proposition is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), which concluded that "the general language . . . employed [in the Alien Contract Labor Act] is broad enough to reach cases and acts which the whole history and life of the country affirm could not have been intentionally legislated against," id. at 472. Until recently, the Court routinely held that when the "letter" of the law conflicted with its "spirit," the latter prevailed. See None of this is meant to suggest that the text of a statute will answer every question raised under it. Nor does it foreclose interpreters from relying on purpose or other background principles to construe a statute. Rather, because the Court's new approach emphasizes that the specification of the means of implementation is "the very essence of legislative choice,"
114 an interpreter concerned with legislative supremacy must show sensitivity to Congress's apparent determination of how much freedom the interpreter should have to consider background purpose. That is, the interpreter must take into account Congress's choice about whether to proceed through rules or standards.
A legislature that seeks to achieve Goal X can do so in one of two ways. First, it can identify the goal and instruct courts or agencies to design rules to achieve the goal. In that event, the subsequent selection of rules implements the actual legislative decision, even if the rules are not what the legislature would have selected itself. The second approach is for the Respecting the lines of compromise evident in the statutory text safeguards those process rights. If bicameralism and presentment gives political minorities the power to block legislation, then it also provides them with the right to insist upon compromise as the price of assent. 121 If an interpretive method smoothes out the rough edges of a compromise to make it more coherent or consistent with the apparent background purpose, such an approach risks diluting the minority's capacity to agree to go only so far and no farther in pursuit of a policy that the majority wishes to enact but cannot without minority support.
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This argument is a purely positive claim about how to make sense of legislative supremacy in our system of bicameralism and presentment. It does not depend on the conclusion that bicameralism and presentment is a normatively desirable method for the exercise of legislative power or that the legislative process should recognize the stakeholders it does in the way that it does. Instead, the analysis here merely suggests how an interpreter wishing faithfully to decode the output of the constitutionally prescribed legislative process should read the final product. From that starting point, it seems that following the lines of compromise is the only sure way to respect a process that has, by design, granted extraordinary power to certain stakeholders.
Applying the same sort of analysis to the constitutional text suggests that the Court's living Constitution tradition does not, in fact, properly link the document to the constitutionmaking process that produced it. That approach, as discussed, proceeds from the premise that constitutionmakers, of necessity, adopted a document that sets forth the "great outlines" and "important objects" of government, leaving interpreters to develop the details. 123 That conception, however, is contrary to the facts, as filtered through the lens supplied by the recent statutory cases. One could go on, but the point is clear: the document consists of an obvious mix of rules and standards. None of them is utterly indeterminate or utterly precise; all require some degree of interpretation. But the degree of detail one finds in the document as a whole itself suggests "the result of compromise and line-item voting."
130 Whether or not constitutionmakers agreed upon the broad principles imagined by proponents of the living Constitution, they necessarily had to bargain about how to put them into effect. Lawmakers must always draw lines of inclusion and exclusion. They must decide questions of the law's scope-how much they wish to take on. They must, as noted, find their preferred mix of rules and standards, and also make judg- 124 If, indeed, the Constitution represents a bundle of compromises, then reading it faithfully requires interpreters to respect the lines of compromise reflected in the textual details-to treat rules as rules and standards as standards. It is true that the constitutionmaking process was adopted on the fly. But that does not negate the fact that its stakeholders agreed to certain ground rules that gave them distinct process rights. Delegates to the Convention agreed to participate on the basis of equal representation (with each state delegation to decide collectively how to cast its vote). 131 For example, the ground rules according to which the states agreed to participate in the constitutionmaking process explicitly gave the residents of small states a disproportionate say in the shape of the Constitution. 132 In addition, although the delegates deferred decisions about the method of ratification until the end of the Convention, historians have suggested that one could reasonably assume that the delegates bargained against the background expectation that they would need to win the assent of a high proportion, if not all, of the states. 133 If nothing else, it is clear that the document's final shape reflected a distribution of bargaining power that gave small states extraordinary leverage in relation to their populations.
134
131 Farrand has suggested that the delegates briefly considered but rejected other arrangements for fear that the Convention would break up if the ground rules did not assure equal state representation in the Convention. See FARRAND, supra note 14, at 57 ("The Pennsylvania delegates . . . urged 'that the large States should unite in firmly refusing to the small States an equal vote, as unreasonable, and as enabling the small States to negative every good system of Government.' The Virginia delegates, however, succeeded in stifling the project for fear that it 'might beget fatal altercations between the large and small States.'"). 132 See Elster, supra note 58, at 369 ("The voting procedure at the Convention . . . increased [the small states'] bargaining power for logrolling purposes."). 133 If the delegates had followed the ratification procedure prescribed by Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation, the Convention would have had to submit the proposed Constitution "to Congress and the state legislatures for their unanimous approval." RAKOVE, supra note 34, at 102-03; see also Elster, supra note 58, at 370 ("Although no ratification procedure was laid down in the convocation of the Convention, many assumed that the Constitution would eventually have to be ratified by the state legislatures. Reasoning from that premise, they argued that the Constitution ought to be tailored so as to be acceptable to those bodies."). If one thinks that contemporary constitutional law should not trace its authority to the constitutionmaking process that produced the document, then these process considerations should not matter. 135 But any system of interpretation that traces the Constitution's authority to its adoption pursuant to Article V will accurately implement the fruits of the prescribed process only if it accounts for the capacity of the relevant stakeholders to insist upon compromise as the price of assent. It is true that, in obvious contrast with legislation, the constitutionmaking process is divided more dramatically between the (Convention's) power to propose and the (ratifiers') power to enact the proposal into law. And this certainly raises the question of why we care if the proposers, rather than the ratifiers, struck a compromise. Still, because the proposers presented the document to the ratifiers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the proposal itself constituted an essential part of the enactment process, and ignoring the compromises reflected in that proposal would negate the terms on which the several states agreed to participate in the process. Again, one might well think it a bad process whose results are unworthy of respect, but if we wish to enforce the results of that process in any meaningful sense, it is necessary to respect the terms on which its participants chose to participate.
C. What Philadelphia Tells Us
Having suggested that the document itself reflects the fruits of legislative compromise, one might ask what the debates of the Philadelphia Convention could possibly tell us. Presumably a reasonable ratifier with any sense of political realities would have inferred the pervasiveness of compromise from the nature of the Convention and the intricacy and variety of the document's provisions. To the extent that the Convention debates might have revealed the compromises actually made, the ratifiers had no access to that information. And if one takes at all seriously the insights of original meaning originalism, an interpreter should never use Farrand's Records to establish the terms of any of the Constitution's compromises, except to the extent 135 For example, one might conclude that the constitutionmaking process was illegitimate and should not bind us. . Or one might think it inappropriate today to be governed by the dead hand of the past. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 33, at 225. As noted, however, at least some nonoriginalists think it relevant to get an accurate read of the original meaning, even if they do not feel bound by it. See supra text accompanying note 17.
